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dc.contributor.authorAirehrour, David
dc.contributor.authorGutierrez, J.
dc.contributor.authorRay, S. K.
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-08T21:47:56Z
dc.date.available2018-10-08T21:47:56Z
dc.date.issued2018-03-30
dc.identifier.issn2203-1693
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10652/4379
dc.description.abstractThe routing protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL) has gained prominence as the standard IoT routing protocol. However, it faces like many other routing protocols diverse attacks. Many studies have been proposed to secure the RPL protocol, and simulation studies have been put forward as the main research method, while testbed experiments, though an authentic research and testing method, have been ignored. Although testbed experiments and simulation studies have their strengths and limitations, testbed techniques could be used as a verifiable validation method for simulation studies. This study is a follow up research work to validate our simulation study, which addressed Blackhole attacks in the RPL routing protocol. In addition, Selective Forwarding attacks are also addressed. It implements a testbed while embedding our Trust-based RPL protocol and the standard RPL protocol in a smart environment configuration. Based on the test experiments, we provide a proof-of-concept of the validity of our claim that our Trust-based RPL protocol provides a comprehensive defence (simulation and testbed) against Blackhole and Selective Forwarding attacks.en_NZ
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherTelSoc : Telecommunications and the Digital Economyen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.18080/ajtde.v6n1.138en_NZ
dc.rightsThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.en_NZ
dc.subjectrouting protocol for low-power and lossy networks (RPL)en_NZ
dc.subjectInternet of Things (IoT)en_NZ
dc.subjectRPLen_NZ
dc.subjectblackhole attacksen_NZ
dc.subjectselective forwarding attacksen_NZ
dc.subjectAS-XM 1000en_NZ
dc.subjecttrust-based RPLen_NZ
dc.subjectstandard RPLen_NZ
dc.subjectIoTen_NZ
dc.titleA trust-based defence scheme for mitigating blackhole and selective forwarding attacks in the RPL routing protocolen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.date.updated2018-10-03T13:30:04Z
dc.rights.holderCopyright Telecommunications Association Incen_NZ
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.18080/ajtde.v6n1.138en_NZ
dc.subject.marsden080303 Computer System Securityen_NZ
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationAirehrour, D., Gutierrez, J., & Ray, S.K. (2018). A Trust-based Defence Scheme for Mitigating Blackhole and Selective Forwarding Attacks in the RPL Routing Protocol. Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy, 6(1), 41-59. doi:10.18080/ajtde.v6n1.138en_NZ
unitec.publication.spage41en_NZ
unitec.publication.lpage59en_NZ
unitec.publication.volume6en_NZ
unitec.publication.issue1en_NZ
unitec.publication.titleAustralian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economyen_NZ
unitec.peerreviewedyesen_NZ
unitec.identifier.roms62722en_NZ
unitec.publication.placeAspendale, Victoria, Australiaen_NZ


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